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Byrtus: Pro Se Defendants and Advisory Counsel

PRO SE DEFENDANTS AND ADVISORY COUNSEL
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court in Farettav.
Californiaheld that implied in the sixth amendment is a constitutional right to represent oneself in criminal trials.'
Recognition of the right was not startling. It was already
protected in federal courts by statute2 and in most states by
constitutional provision.3 Nevertheless, pro se defendants
have long created problems for courts and constitutional
recognition of the right complicates matters further by
allowing pro se representation to compete with constitutional rights to the assistance of counsel and the right to a
fair trial. One tool courts have used to try to resolve these
competing considerations has been "standby" or "advisory"
counsel. Unfortunately, the attorney who finds himself cast
in this role has few guidelines to follow. Even though appellate courts comment approvingly on a trial judge's appointment of advisory counsel, rarely do they comment on
the role itself.
This comment will discuss a variety of matters regarding the rights of the pro se defendant and the consequences
of his choosing self representation. Two areas derive from
the recent Wyoming Supreme Court case Irvin v. State.4 The
discussion will examine the status of the pro se defendant in
order to present an analysis of the context in which standby
or advisory counsel operates so that both a general perspective and some particular suggestions can be presented for
the attorney who is appointed to act in that capacity. Since
there is little law governing his actions, only by understanding the context in which he operates can advisory counsel
properly perform his role. The context to be presented consists of two areas. The first, is that the right to appear pro se
as recognized in Farettaoften conflicts with the defendant's
need for an attorney in order to have a fair trial which was
the rationale for extending the right to counsel. The second
area encompasses a variety of considerations concerning the
status and rights of apro se defendant such as; rules governCopyright© 1979 by the University of Wyoming
1. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Farettal.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970).

3.

A list can be found in Faretta at 813-14.

4.

Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1978).

5.

The right to counsel was gradually expanded over many years in a long line of cases.
See, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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ing his appearance, waiver of counsel, his standard of competency, and his rights to have access to legal materials and
time to prepare his case.
I.

DISTINCTIONS AS TO THE ROLES OF COUNSEL

"Standby," "advisory," and "co-counsel" are terms
which have been used by courts to describe attorneys who
have been appointed to perform various duties in regard to
pro se defendants. However, at present there is little consistency of usage among jurisdictions. For the purposes of
this paper and to encourage consistent usage it is important
to distinguish these terms at the outset. They designate
three different roles in which an attorney, either by choice or
judicial appointment, may be cast because a defendant
wishes to appear in court on his own behalf. Each raises
questions as to the proper attorney-client relationship and
the activities the attorney should or should not undertake in
the judicial proceedings in which the defendant is involved.
Standby counsel: Specifically "standby counsel"
designates an attorney who is instructed by a judge to attend or remain at trial as a spectator to the proceedings, but
who will be ordered to take over the defense if the judge
should need to remove the defendant from pro se status. The
use of standby counsel arises from Illinois v. Allen.'
Although the issue in that case was the right of a defendant
to be present at trial and confront witnesses, the defendant
had appeared pro se, became disruptive and abusive during
trial, was removed, and later returned with counsel taking
over the defense. When the defendant again became disruptive he was removed from the courtroom for the remainder of
the trial. As in Allen the most' frequent reason for removing
a pro se defendant is that he has become disruptive either as
a deliberate tactic intended to create a mistrial or from the
frustrations of trying to perform as an attorney without having had the training of one. A court's intention in appointing
standby counsel is that a mistrial, and the subsequent time
and expense of a new trial, be avoided by having an attorney
present who is prepared to take over the defense. The procedure in Allen was approved by the Supreme Court in Faretta. 7
6.
7.

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
Faretta at 834, n. 46.
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Advisory counsel: As the term itself suggests, advisory
counsel assists a pro se defendant in preparing for trial and
appears in court, usually at the defense table, ready to
answer the defendant's questions as to procedure and
strategy and to offer advice. Most courts appointing "standby" counsel intend for the attorney to play both standby and
advisory roles.8 This dual role is consistent with the majority
view voiced in Faretta:
Of course, a State may-even over objection by the
accused-appoint a "standby counsel" to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to
be available to represent the accused in the event
that termination of the defendant's self representation is necessary. 9
The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to
the Function of the Trial Judge, also discusses the use of
"standby" counsel. However, given the constitutional
status of the right to appear pro se, it may contemplate too
much.
When a defendant has been permitted to proceed
without the assistance of counsel, the trial judge
should consider appointment of standby counsel to
assist the defendant when called upon and to call
the judge's attention to matters favorable to the accused upon which the judge should rule on his own
motion. 10
While a court may, under any circumstances, appoint advisory counsel and order him to assist the defendant if the
defendant so requests, counsel's presence at the defense
table and his activity in court may be matters beyond the
control of the court. The right to appear pro se as sanctioned
by Faretta may include the defendant's right to appear in
court as one defending himself, a right which would be infringed if counsel were present or played an active role contrary the defendant's wishes.' 1 Of course, if the defendant
did not object to counsel's presence, there would be no
8.
9.
10.

E.g., United States v. Corrigan, 401 F. Supp. 795, 800 (D. Wyo. 1975).
Faretta at 834, n. 46.

11.

United States v. Dougherty, 154 App. D.C. 76, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 (1972).

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, 6.7 (1972).
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ground upon which to later base a claim. Court directed activity by the attorney such as calling the judge's attention to
matters,. could constitute an even more serious infringement
of the right.
Similarly, Chief Justice Burger's view in Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania" may no longer be applicable given Faretta.In
a concurring opinion he advised trial judges faced with
defendants who refused counsel or wished to discharge their
attorneys to appoint "standby" counsel "to perform all the
services a trained advocate would perform ordinarily by examination and cross examination of witnesses, objecting to
evidence and making closing argument."' 3 The Chief
Justice's concern was that the integrity of the judicial process be protected. Because a criminal trial involves the
public interest in the integrity of the judicial system, he said,
"the presence and participation of counsel" was justified "to
vindicate the process itself."' 4 Although there are circumstances under which the activities listed by the Chief
Justice might be performed by advisory counsel, for a court
to require that they be performed would effectively make the
right to self-representation an empty right.
Chief Justice Burger dissented in Faretta.In addition to
presenting his disagreements with the analysis of the maj ority, his dissent is concerned with the problem of insuring
that pro se defendants receive fair trials and the consequential damage to the integrity of the judicial system if they do
not.
Co-counsel: On occasion a defendant will request that
the court appoint him as co-counsel. If granted, his attorney
then becomes co-counsel with the defendant. The request
may be for one of two purposes. First, the defendant may
wish to play an active role in the entire trial, acting as a part
of the defense "team". This occurs most frequently in
"political" trials and the most noteworthy case was that of
Angela Davis. 6 More frequently, the defendant requests co12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
Id at 468.
Id at 468.
Faretta at 838-39 (dissenting opinion).
See, Note, SelfRepresentation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1498-1507 (1971); cf. United States v. Swinton, 400 F.
Supp. 805 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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counsel status for a specific purpose. That is, he wishes his
attorney to represent him, but there is a specific task he
wishes to perform either by himself or in addition to his attorney such as questioning witnesses or addressing the jury.
Prior to Farettathe rule governing such requests, even
in jurisdictions which recognized the right to appear pro se,
was that there is no right to "hybrid" representation. 7 Since
Faretta most courts considering the matter have retained
the rule."5 Support for the rule lies in practical considerations
but the reasoning of Farettaat least suggests an alternate
view. Courts are disinclined to allow "hybrid" representation because they see it as introducing inefficiency, if not
chaos, into trial proceedings which should be orderly. The
fear is well based. Most trial judges are already all too
familiar with the problems posed by defendants who
disagree with the tactics chosen by their attorney, particularly their court appointed attorney.'" Nevertheless,
since both the right to counsel and the right to selfrepresentation are constitutional, there is a question as to
whether a defendant can be forced to choose between them
or whether the dual rights require that he be permitted to apportion them as he sees best. The effect of continuing the
"no right to hybrid representation" rule is to place a high
price on the exercise of a constitutional right. So far,
however, few courts have been willing to view the dual rights
as requiring this outcome."0

II.

CONFLICT OF RIGHTS

The right to counsel and the right to self-representation
are separate and distinct constitutional rights.2 ' Yet,
17.

United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1024 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 940
(1976).
18. United States v. Cyhers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den. 431 U.S. 972 (1977);
United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 894
(1976); Moore v. State. 83 Wis. 2d 285, 265 N.W.2d 510 (1978).
19. Frequently a defendant elects to defend pro se because of such disagreements.
20. A pre-Faretta exception is Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974). On the basis
of the Kentucky Constitution which states that a defendant is entitled to be
represented "by himself and counsel" the court concluded that a defendant could
make a limited waiver of counsel and specify the duties he wished to have counsel
perform. The question was also considered by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
m Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272 (1977). Initially the court found that the defendant, who had submitted a written statement to the trial judge demanding the right
to cross-examine witnesses, had effectively reserved the right for himself, never
allocating it to his attorney. On rehearing, however, the court reversed itself and affirmed the conviction. It interpreted the provision of the Texas Constitution which
allowed representation "by himself or counsel, or both" to support the "no right to
hybrid representation" rule.
21. Faretta at 819, n. 15.
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because a defendant is almost invariably either represented
by counsel or by himself, both rights cannot be satisfied. One
or the other must be forfeited. More important to the role of
advisory counsel is that the rationale for broadening the
right to counsel was that a defendant without an attorney
was unlikely to receive a fair trial. 2 If this rationale still
holds, advisory counsel may be the chief protector of a pro se
defendant's right to a fair trial.
In the face of strong dissent, the United States Supreme
Court in Faretta held that implied in the sixth amendment is
a constitutional right to defend oneself in person at criminal
trials. Faretta was charged with grand theft and was appointed a public defender at his arraignment. Well before
trial he requested permission to represent himself. The trial
judge made a preliminary ruling accepting Faretta's waiver
of counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se. Several weeks
later the judge held another hearing at which he questioned
Faretta on his knowledge of the hearsay rule and the
challenges of potential jurors at voir dire. After questioning
him, the judge ruled that Faretta had not made a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, ruled that he
had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense (as
was the law in California under People v. Sharp"), and again
appointed a public defender. At trial Faretta was represented by an attorney. The California Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's ruling that there was no constitutional violation, affirmed the conviction, and later denied
rehearing. The California Supreme Court denied review.
On the basis of the widespread recognition of the right
to appear in propria persona, a review of English and
American history of representation at trial, and the "structure of the Sixth Amendment" the United States Supreme
Court held that: "The Sixth Amendment does not provide
merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants
to the accused personally the right to make his defense." 2 '
Although a defendant may choose to allocate his defense to
an attorney, "to thrust counsel upon the accused, against his
22. See, note 5.
23. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 4893, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
24. Faretta at 819.
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considered wish ...violates the logic of the Amendment."25

"Unless the accused has acquiesed in such representation,
the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by
the constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his
26

defense."

It may be necessary for a defendant to have the right to
represent himself in order to assure the defense offered by an
attorney is consented to. Problematic, however, is the question of the quality of the pro se defense. The rationale for extending the right to counsel has consistently been that a
defendant without an attorney is at a severe disadvantage
and is most unlikely to receive a fair trial. This idea was
simply stated in Gideon v. Wainwright: "[I]n our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him."21 7 A fuller rationale had

previously been provided in Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counselat every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. If that be true
of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of
the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.2"
25.
26.
27.
28.

Faretta at 820.
Faretta at 821.
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 5, at 344.
Powell v. Alabama, supra note 5, at 68-69. Also cited by Chief Justice Burger in
Faretta at 838-39 (dissenting opinion).
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If the intelligent as well as the poor man is at a loss in
the judicial system without an attorney and "cannot be
assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him"
what is the fate of the defendant who elects to defend pro se?
Although he may have waived his right to counsel, there is
no reason to think that he has in fact fared any better than
the passages from Gideon and Powell predict that he will,
nor that he has been in any less need of counsel.2 9 More
specifically the question is: if a defendant has a sixth amendment right to represent himself, how can his fourteenth and
fifth amendment rights to due process and a fair trial be protected? The majority in Farettawas not unaware of the problem, but chose to emphasize the value of individual choice
rather than allow the imposition of an attorney on a defendant who does not want one. 0 If Faretta is taken literally,
the implication is that the rationale of Gideon and Powell is
not to be applied to defendants who elect to defend pro se.
Such an interpretation is extreme. Although it is relatively
simple to distinguish between defendants who never had a
right to counsel from defendants who have the right but
choose to waive it. This distinction provides no guarantee
that justice has been better served in the case of the latter,
rather than the former.,1
Appointment of advisory counsel for pro se defendants
is one indication that courts find this implication distasteful.
Frequently a court appoints advisory counsel because making legal advice available is at least a step toward protecting
the rights of a defendant who, because of his ignorance of the
law, may jeopardize them . 32 Advisory counsel must, then, on
the one hand allow the defendant to conduct his defense, yet,
on the other hand draw from his own experience and learning
to protect the defendant's right to a fair trail while, in most
cases, not being allowed to take an active part in the trial.3
There are no penalties if the attorney fails the latter half of
his task; his services are provided to the defendant by the
court as assistance and not in fulfillment of a right.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See, United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1971).
Faretta at 834.
Questions concerning the competency of a pro se defendant to present his defense
are discussed further in Section VI.
See, United States v. Corrigan, supra note 8.
For a list of other functions advisory counsel serves see Note, FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DEFEND PRO SE, 5 CAPITAL U. L. REv.. 277,
287-88 (1976).
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III.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF A

Pro Se

REQUEST

Rules governing the granting of permission to proceed
pro se are relatively straightforward and in most cases have
changed little since Faretta5 ' However, with one exception
they do not clearly derive from United States Supreme Court
decisions, so rulings of individual jurisdictions must be consulted. The following rules are widely recognized and have
frequently been adopted as a set.
1. The assertion of the right must be timely. Although
Faretta had made his request several weeks prior to trial,
"most courts of appeals have established the rule that the
fundamental right to conduct the case pro se must be
claimed before the trial begins." 35 This requirement has been
adopted by all states which have considered the matter, including California, home of Faretta."'
The rationale for this requirement is that the defendant
must be given "a last clear chance to assert his constitutional right" and since a point must be established "that
point should not come before meaningful trial proceedings
have commenced." 37 Occasionally courts have found it
necessary to draw an exact line. In Chapman v. United
States38 the court was faced with deciding whether or not a
request which came after the attorneys had announced
"ready," but prior to empaneling the jury was valid. The
court reasoned that the declaration of "ready could not be
considered final because the defense could not be considered
"ready" when the defendant was being represented by an attorney he no longer wanted." 9 It is uniformly agreed that
once a trial has begun, granting a request to defend pro se is
within the discretionary powers of the court.4"
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

For pre-Faretta cases see: Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
den. sub. nom. DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973); and particularly United States v. Plattner, 330
F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1977), see also, the discussion
at 893-95.
People v. Windham, 19 Cal. 3d 121, 560 P.2d 1187, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1977), cert. den.
434 U.S. 848 (1977), reh. den. 434 U.S. 961 (1977).
Chapman v. United States, supra note 35, at 895.
Id at 895.
Id at 895; Acccord, United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973), (motion
was timely when made before the jury was sworn).
E.g., Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1976).
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2. The assertion of the right of self-representation
must be unequivocal. "Unequivocal" means that the request
must be for pro se status in contrast to a request to act as cocounsel.4' At present there is no requirement that a defendant be informed he has a right to conduct his own defense.4 2
Courts have resisted such a requirement for fear that complications may arise similar to those associated with the
right to counsel. Unfortunately, since there is no right to be
informed, a defendant who vaguely understands that he may
represent himself but is unaware that he is not entitled to
"hybrid" representation may find his legitimate request
denied if he has not phrased it properly. Similarly, if the
defendant does not understand the distinction between
"defense" and "advisory" counsel, he may hesitate to assert
his right to self-representation because he does not wish to
appear in court without assistance from an attorney. Rather
than requiring that defendants be informed of the right, the
solution seems to be that courts, as well as defendants' attorneys whether retained or appointed, make careful inquiry
and advise defendants when the need arises.
If a request is not unequivocal, pro se status can be
denied.43 The effect of an unequivocal assertion is to preclude
later claims that the defendant was denied the assistance of
counsel. The assertion by itself, however, is not sufficient for
this purpose, but must be accompanied by a finding by the
court that the defendant is competent.
3. A defendant who wishes to appear pro se "should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that 'he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open.' -44Most jurisdictions which have considered the matter have adopted the same language as that quoted from
Faretta.11 The content of the warnings to be given varies
somewhat but usually includes statements about the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See, United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 925
(1976).
Tuckson v. State, 364 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1976); State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 220
S.E.2d 495 11975), cert. den. 433 U.S. 907 (1977); People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10,
324 N.E.2d 322, 36 N.Y.S.2d 837 (19741.
Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1973).
Faretta at 835, quoting Adams v. United States ex. reL McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942).
E.g., People v. Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 247 N.W.2d 857, 860 (1976); but see People
v. Anthony, 42 [Ul.App. 3d 102, 355 N.E.2d 680 (App. Ct. 1976).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/8

10

Byrtus: Pro Se Defendants and Advisory Counsel

1979

COMMENTS

237

seriousness of the charge the defendant is facing, his lack of
knowledge of the law, and that he will receive no favor or
special treatment from the court."6
This requirement serves to insure a finding by the court
that the defendant is making an intelligent choice and is
competent to represent himself. Inquiry may be made into
the general intelligence and mental capacities of the defendant, as is required by Johnson v. Zerbst in regard to a
waiver of the right to counsel. 7 The competence in question,
however, is mental capacity to knowingly act and not
knowledge of the law or competence in legal skills. 8
Whether finding that a defendant is competent to appear pro se is the same as finding that he is competent to
stand trial or whether it requires a finding of greater competence is not uniformly agreed upon. The New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Reason 9 rejected the argument that
a greater competency was needed, but Justice Jason wrote a
strong dissent citing, among other cases, Westbrook v.
Arizona.5 In Westbrook the United States Supreme Court in
a per curium opinion clearly distinguished the two:
Although petitioner received a hearing on the issue
of his competence to stand trial, there appears to
have been no hearing or inquiry into the issue of his
competence to waive his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel and proceed, as he did, to conduct his own defense. 5 1
The Court went on to quote Johnson v. Zerbst and remanded
for proceedings in light of Pate v. Robinson.5 2 The Court has
not otherwise addressed the issue. In so far as the mental
capacities necessary for a defendant to understand the
nature of the charges against him, to follow the proceedings
at trial, and to confer with his attorney are different from the
mental ability necessary to act as one's own attorney, there
is good reason to require a high standard of competency to
defend pro se.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

53

For an example of the type of questions used see People v. Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 3d
568. 138 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1977). A full exchange of questions and answers can
be found in United States v. Pavich, 568 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978).
Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 5, at 464.
Faretta at 836.
People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351, 334 N.E.2d 572, 574, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1975).
Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
Id at 150.
Pate v. Robinson. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Cf. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) and
State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1976).
See, United States v. Dougherty, supra note 11. at 1123, n. 13.
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Whether or not competence to elect to defend oneself is
the same as competence to waive counsel is a more complicated question. In Westbrook the court mentions waiver
of counsel along with pro se representation. Such, of course,
is the inevitable consequence of a valid waiver of counsel.
However, it is possible for a defendant to request and be
granted permission to defend himself without any mention
of counsel being made. The issue then raised is whether a
"knowing and intelligent" assertion of the right to defend
pro se is, at the same time, a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of the right to counsel. "Knowing and intelligent"
which is the requirement for a valid waiver of counsel"' was
used by the Court in Farettato describe the defendant's decision to represent himself." In most cases the decision to
represent oneself is likely to be a genuine choice between two
alternatives. But the choice itself is a consequence of the "no
right to hybrid representation" rule and not the rights involved. Therefore, unless the matter of counsel is raised
otherwise, there is no guarantee that a pro se defendant has
considered using an attorney and chosen not to be
represented by one. Similarly, there is no guarantee that a
defendant who understands what it is to represent himself,
also understands the benefits of having an attorney do it for
him. Such a defendant could legitimately claim on appeal
that there had been no "knowing and intelligent" waiver of
the effeccounsel and that, consequently, he did not receive
56
tive representation to which he was entitled.
IV. Pro Se

REPRESENTATION AND THE WAIVER OF COUNSEL

As the previous discussion indicates, it is wise to require
that a defendant make a valid waiver of counsel as a condition of defending pro se. In most cases there is probably little
factual difference between the defendant's competence to
assert one right and his competence to waive the other. Nor
is there likely to be a question as to his awareness of the
choice he was making. 7 Most frequently, the defendant
54.
55.
56.
57.

Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 5. See also, Adams v. United States ex. reL McCann,
supra note 44.
See also, Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1976); Cason v. State, 31 Md. App.
121, 354 A.2d 840 (1976).
Difficulties concerning the forced choice the defendant must make are discussed in
Section V.
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knows he is choosing to represent himself rather than have
an attorney because he does not want the attorney he has to
continue to represent him. Furthermore, the defendant
should have been advised of his right to counsel when he was
arraigned; the Faretta warnings may have told him that it
would be advantageous to have counsel represent him; and
inquiry by the court may have revealed that he was aware of
his right to have an attorney but was making a conscious, informed choice to defend himself.
Despite this, a defendant may make a timely, unambigubus request to defend himself, the court may find he has
the mental capacity to do so and give the Farettawarnings
necessary to point out the "dangers and disadvantages" he
will face, and the defendant so allowed to proceed, all without having waived counsel. The defendant's request may
stem from ignorance or uncertainty. He may not understand
his right to have counsel appointed or understanding his
right, may not consider himself indigent. He may not be indigent and yet not have the cash retainer required by private
counsel. More important, not having consulted with an attorney, he may not understand the charges and evidence
against him and the seriousness of the consequences. He
may believe that he is innocent and that his "defense" will
easily clear matters up once he gets to court. He may admit
to all the facts alleged but not believe there will be a trial
because he does not understand that his actions constituted
a crime. He may not understand the role of the prosecutor,
believing that the state's investigation will reveal that there
was no crime or that he did not commit it. 5 As a result, a
defendant who may be mentally competent to represent
himself proceeds to trial without having made an "intelligent and knowing" waiver of counsel.
The FarettaCourt seems to have adopted the "knowing
and intelligent" waiver of counsel standard as a requirement
of pro se representation:
When an accused manages his own defense he relinquishes as a purely factual matter many of the
58.

Misunderstandings of the operation of the judicial system cannot be
underestimated. A recent poll found that 30% of the population believe that the job
of a district attorney is to defend an accused who does not have a lawyer. Vox
Populi, NEWSWEEK, XCI, No. 13, 87 (March 27, 1978).
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traditional benefits associated with the right to
counsel. For this reason in order to represent himself the accused must "knowingly and intelligently"
forego those relinquished benefits.59
In fact Farettahas been interpreted to require this finding. 0
However, the rule has not been uniformly adhered to. Many
courts, while not rejecting the rule, have ignored it. While inquiry by the trial judge may serve the same purpose, unless
the inquiry is sufficient, there may be no waiver.
Without sufficient inquiry a waiver cannot be found to
be implied in the request to defend pro se. A waiver "is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege."'" Since the right to counsel and
the right to defend pro se are independent, the assertion of
one right cannot imply the waiver of the other. 6 Nor can a
waiver be inferred from a silent record. 6 Furthermore, even
if a decision to act pro se is itself "knowing and intelligent",
neither the decision nor the Farettawarnings expressly concern the right to counsel. Since the right is not expressly
dealt with, there can be no implication that there has been an
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment" of the right.
In State v. Renshaw6 4 the defendant on the first day of
trial requested that new counsel be appointed for him
because he was dissatisfied with his attorney. The trial judge
removed the attorney but refused to appoint new counsel.
Instead, the attorney was appointed on an advisory basis
with the defendant acting pro se. However, Renshaw did not
want to represent himself and remained silent throughout
the trial. Furthermore, counsel, acting on instructions from
the judge, also remained silent. On appeal the court found
that no waiver of the right to counsel had been made. The
trial court therefore, was not justified in treating the expres59.

Faretta at 835 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 5, and Von Moltke v. Gillies,
supra note 55).
60. United States v. Corrigan, supra note 8, at 799. For an earlier case supporting the requirement see United States v. Spencer, supra note 29. Contra. People v. Anthony,
supra note 45.
61. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 5, at 1023.
62. See, Note 21 and Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
63. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 5. See also, Cumley v. Cockran, 369 U.S. 506, 516
(1962) and AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, 7.3
(1967).
64. State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 347 A.2d 219 (1975).
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sion of dissatisfaction with assigned counsel, combined with
a request for new counsel, as a waiver of the right to counsel
and an election to defend pro se. Rather, the appellate court
specified to have a waiver of counsel the record must show
both that the defendant is competent to waive and that he
"knowingly and intelligently has done so; after being made
aware of the advantages and disadvantages of self representation." 5 Although denying the request for substitute counsel was not error, the court added, the judge should not have
dismissed the attorney since the defendant did not wish to
appear pro se.
As in Renshaw the reason for not allowing an implied
waiver is most vivid when the defendant makes it clear that66
he does not wish to represent himself. In Thomas v.State
the defendant was adamant in that he wished to have his
counsel removed and have another lawyer appointed. He was
equally insistent that he was not capable of defending
himself "because I don't know the law that good. '6 At trial
Thomas represented himself. After citing Powell v. Alabama
the appellate court found that there had been no waiver of
counsel and reversed. The trial court "should have ordered
counsel to render the fullest possible legal representation
under the circumstances with or without cooperation of
68
defendant."
Establishing that a defendant has made a valid waiver
of counsel and is acting pro se "with eyes open" would have
the additional benefit of precluding claims that advisory
counsel should have objected to evidence, made motions,
cross-examined witnesses, or performed some other act at
trial. Without a valid waiver, an advisory attorney may feel
himself obligated to take an active part in the trial in order
to assure that his client has the effective representation to
which he is entitled. Yet, in doing so the attorney may
violate not only his client's wish to defend himself but his
constitutional right to do so. Once there is a valid waiver, advisory counsel is freed from his obligation to meet the defendant's right to counsel and is free to advise the defendant
how to best make the defense he chooses to make.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.at 266.
Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64 (Texas Crim. App. 1977), reh. den. (1977).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 68.
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The waiver is particularly beneficial when the defendant

wishes to pursue a trial strategy which, although legitimate,
the attorney considers unwise. In such a case the defendant,
because he appears pro se, is in charge of the defense and the
attorney, because counsel has been waived, the assigned attorney can advise him how to best pursue his chosen
strategy. Advisory counsel should not, of course, provide advice which would conflict with either his duties as an officer
of the court or the American
Bar Association's Code of Pro69
Responsibility.
fessional
In addition to clarifying the role of advisory counsel, requiring a valid waiver of counsel establishes whether a defendant is requesting permission to act as co-counsel or whether
he wishes to appear pro se with advisory counsel assisting
him. Although the "no right to hybrid representation" rule
has been applied to both requests, its application and effect
is very different in each case. If a defendant requests cocounsel status, he is indeed asking for hybrid representation
and the denial of his request leaves him represented by
counsel. In contrast, if a defendant wishes to proceed pro se,
particularly if he has waived counsel, his request is not for
hybrid representation but for assistance in understanding
the law he will need to know in order to present his own
defense. Granting a request for advisory counsel is unlikely
to complicate the trial proceedings, but rather would tend to
expedite matters by providing a ready source of information
and advice without which the defendant may flounder and
create confusion. Advisory counsel can best give this
assistance if there has been a waiver of the right to counsel.
V.

CHOOSING TO DEFEND

Pro Se:

HOBSON'S CHOICE

Although there are many reasons why a defendant
might elect to represent himself rather than have an attorney, the most frequent, at least as reflected in appellate
cases, is that the defendant disagrees with his attorney over
how his defense is to be handled. 0 Having reached the point
of strong disagreement, defendants do not always conclude
that they would rather do it themselves. Understanding the
69. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
70. The attorney, of course, decides on trial strategy. People v. Thompson, 69 Mich.
App. 465, 245 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App.1976).
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importance of having an attorney, they frequently try to obtain other counsel. If they have retained counsel, they can
fire their attorney and hire another. However, if the trial
date is at hand, the court may not allow the first attorney to
withdraw from the case. Choices of indigent defendants who
have appointed counsel are even more limited. Their right to
an attorney does not include the right to select the attorney
who is to represent them.7" And although a defendant has a
right to the attorney of his choice and must be given
reasonable time to obtain counsel,7" a defendant with appointed counsel does not have a right to obtain a different attorney simply because he disagrees with his present one.7"
There is a distinct difference, however, between not allowing
a defendant to name the attorney to be appointed and refusing to appoint substitute counsel when there is serious
disagreement between a defendant and his attorney.7 4 Not
granting a request for substitute counsel may raise an issue
as to whether or not the defendant received a fair trial in
which his defense was presented.
Recently the Wyoming Supreme Court was faced with
this question in Irvin v. State.7 5 Defendant was on retrial on
charges of aggravated robbery. Prior to the date of trial the
attorney, a public defender, filed a motion asking that his office be relieved of all obligations to defend Irvin. The motion
was supported by an affidavit stating:
We are unable to achieve the rapport, trust and confidence of said Irvin necessary to the vigorous
defense to which he is constitutionally entitled. 6
Though the motion was never formally denied, the attorney
was informed by the court that it would not be granted. On
the morning of trial Irvin submitted a handwritten petition
requesting both permission to defend pro se and a continuance. He was permitted to defend himself with the public
defender present as advisory counsel but was not given the
continuance. 7 On appeal the Supreme Court ruled that the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See generally, 66 A.L.R.3d 996 (1975); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3rd
Cir. 1978).
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
Lofton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1973).
State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 139 S.E.2d 667 (1965).
Irvin v. State, supra note 4.
Id. at 3.
The denial of a continuance as well as substitute counsel was at issue on appeal. The
matter of continuances for pro se defendants is discussed in Section VI.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 8

244

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

motion to appoint substitute counsel was subject to the
discretion of the trial court and its action would be altered
only if there was an abuse of discretion. To show abuse required a factual showing that there was good cause for the
appointment of substitute counsel. "Good cause," the court
said:
Is to be found in incompetence, commitment to a
position or an interest which would conflict with the
furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or
other good reason to conclude that appointed
counsel is unable to furnish effective assistance. 8
Of the three reasons given by the court only the third is
likely to result in controversy on appeal. Attorneys appointed for indigent defendants are usually experienced trial
lawyers. Although it is possible for an attorney to have a
conflict of interest, most attorneys would recognize it and request to be relieved of the assignment. Although Irvin's
claim might seem to come under the category of "other good
reason," the court ruled that there had not been an abuse of
discretion without specifically discussing this category. Apparently it concluded that the defendant's lack of "rapport,
trust, and confidence" in his attorney did not prevent the attorney from furnishing effective assistance. In a dissenting
opinion Justice Rose argued that mutual confidence between
an attorney and his client is essential in order for the attorney to furnish effective assistance. "I find the law to be
that where a defendant shows good cause why mutual confidence and trust between him and his attorney no longer exist, the court should substitute counsel."7 9 The dissenting
opinion also rejected the majority's view that Irvin's election to defend himself involved a valid waiver of counsel.
Rather, it pointed out:
the defendant could either accept the representation
of a lawyer in whom he had no confidence and who
admittedly did not feel he could furnish the defense
to which the defendant was constitutionaly entitled
-or-the defendant could go it alone unprepared.
This was no choice at all!!80
78.
79.
80.

Irvin v. State. supra note 4, at 1069, 1070.
Id. at 1072 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 1072 (dissenting opinion).
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Some courts have termed this limited choice "Hobson's
choice""' and though not a pleasant one to make, it is faced
by many defendants. This forced choice is most objectionable when, as in State v. Renshaw and Thomas v. State,
the defendant clearly does not want either alternative. Requiring a valid waiver of counsel can prevent the forced
choice in such cases. Irvin, however, though wanting an attorney, was willing to choose to represent himself rather
than have the one he had been appointed. At that point there
can be a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel even
though it has come about only through a forced choice. The
issue, however, is the fairness of the forced choice.
Motions for substitute counsel are in most jurisdictions
considered to be subject to the discretion of the court. In
granting such motions a court is faced with two problems.
First, if it grants the request without requiring a showing of
good cause, it may grant the motion only to be later confronted with another request, ad infinitum. Second, even if
the dispute between the attorney and the defendant is genuine and there is little likelihood that the request will be
repeated, considerable administrative problems may be
raised, particularly if the trial date is near. A new attorney
will need time to prepare and a continuance may be needed,
rescheduling the trial may delay it for months, and possibly
with a new attorney on the case another series of pre-trial
motions will begin. Yet, one must ask can there be effective
representation when there is a serious conflict between the
attorney and his client? An additional question is whether
the election to defend pro se under such circumstances is
itself a denial of the effective representation of counsel.
Some courts find the choice the defendant must make to
be unproblematic because the election of pro se representation, though not the original desire of the defendant, is a
clear choice between alternatives. 2 Other courts have been
81.

82.

"Hobson's choice: the option of taking one thing offered or nothing. Named from
Tobias Hobson, the Cambridge carrier (commemorated by Milton in two Epitaphs),
who let out horses, and is said to have compelled customers to take the horse which
happened to be next to the stable door, or go without." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DicTIONARY, C,369. The application of the term seems to be that the indigent defendant
has the choice of taking the horse assigned by the court or walking through the trial
himself.
Maynard v. Meachum, supra note 57, at 278. Cf. People v. Longuemire, 77 Mich.
App. 17, 257 N.W.2d 273 (1977); German v. State, 373 N.E.2d 880 (Ind.1978).
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more sympathetic to the dilemma the defendant faces. In
Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh83 defendant's attorney requested a continuance because he had not had adequate time
to prepare for trial. The trial judge, believing the attorney
had had considerable time because he had represented the
defendant at arraignment, denied the motion. In fact, the attorney had not been appointed until eight days before trial.
He had acted at the arraignment because he was representing the defendant in other matters at the time. On the morning of trial the defendant, through his attorney, announced
that he did not wish to have counsel represent him. On appeal the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reversed the conviction. It reasoned that to construe the election to proceed
pro se under such circumstances as a waiver of counsel
would mean that the defendant could protect himself only by
either refusing to go to trial or by remaining silent
throughout.8 4
Short of granting substitute counsel there does not
seem to be any good answer to the problems posed by defendants who must make Hobson's choice. Several steps, however, are available which could compensate for forcing the
choice. As previously mentioned requiring a valid waiver of
counsel can eliminate the most distasteful cases. Inquiry by
the trial judge into the reasons for the request can also be
useful and has been required in some jurisdictions. 5
Although the decision would remain within the court's
discretion, inquiry would serve to disclose whether the
dispute was merely a disagreement over trial tactics or a
serious breach of relations between the attorney and the
defendant. "To compel one charged with grevious crime to
undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom
he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to
deprive him of the effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever." 6 Requiring trial judges to make an inquiry would
have the effect of requiring them to find there is no good
cause, be it incompetence, conflict of interest, "or other good
reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to fur83.
84.
85.
86.

Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 353 N.E.2d 732 (Mass. 1972).
Id. at 737. See also, United States ex rel Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.
1975) and Wright v. State, 32 Md. App. 60, 359 A.2d 1 11976).
United States v. Morrisey, 461 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1972).
Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendant's four requests for
substitute counsel had been summarily dismissed).
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nish effective assistance" to grant the request. Inquiry
would be minimal,8 7 but failure to inquire could be reversible
error. SS
A third remedy would be to allow the defendant to defend pro se and assign him advisory counsel with the
understanding that counsel would be permitted to perform
duties either as needed by the defendant or as agreed upon at
the beginning of the trial.89 In order for advisory counsel not
to have the burden of representing the defendant there
would need to be a valid waiver of the right to counsel. The
defendant would then not have a claim on appeal that conflict with his attorney prevented effective representation,
yet at the same time the burden of defending pro se would be
lessened.
A final alternative is to deny the motion for substitute
counsel, retain the appointed attorney, but grant a form of
"hybrid" representation. The limits would be determined by
the defendant's reasons for dissatisfaction with his attorney
and the extent to which he waives the right to be represented
in those matters.9 0 Although such an arrangement would
complicate the trial proceedings, as long as there is no threat
of disruption and no better alternative available, the convenience of the court should not be sufficient reason to deny a
remedy that would help to assure that the defendant
receives a fair trial.
VI.

COMPETENCY OF THE

Pro Se

DEFENSE

Although finding a valid waiver of counsel precludes
later claims that the right to counsel has been denied, a different issue is raised by the defendant who claims that his
own ineptitude denied him effective representation. In Faretta the Supreme Court dealt with this type of claim in the
same footnote in which it discussed "standby" counsel:
The right to self representation is not a license to
abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a
87. United States v. Hart, 557 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 906 (1977).
88. United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973).
89. E.g., United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975).
90. For examples in which mixed representation has been successful see: Houston v.
State, 246 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1976); Wake v. Barker, supra note 20; and Bayless v.
United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).
91. Faretta at 835, n. 46.
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license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus, whatever else
may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot
thereafter complain that the quality of his own
defense amounted to a denial of "effective
assistance of counsel." 91
The point has been widely accepted. 92 Pro se defendants are
held to the same standards as attorneys. When a defendant
acts as an attorney, he must abide by the rules of evidence
and procedure and other regulations governing the conduct
of attorneys at trial. Likewise, if he does not raise objections
at trial, he cannot raise them on appeal unless there is plain
error. 93 Additionally, most courts have been unwilling to apply even the "farce, sham, or mockery" standard of comthat they will
petence to pro se defendants for 9fear
4
deliberately take that course of action.
Nonetheless there is a problem when a defendant who
represents himself does not present even a semblance of a
defense. Such a trial would seem to violate all considerations
of fairness and be precisely the sort of case Gideon, Powell,
and others were intended to prevent." In Martinez v.
People96 the Supreme Court of Colorado was faced with such
a case. The court acknowledged that the Colorado Constitution granted the right to defend pro se and that the trial
judge had made sufficient inquiry so that the defendant had
an "intelligent understanding of the consequences.' ' 91
Despite this, the court found that the judge had erred in failing to protect the defendant's rights by not instructing the
jury on a defense going to a vital element of the crime charged even though the defendant had not requested the charge.
The absence of a defense attorney and the ineptitude of the
defendant, the court said, resulted in a lack of due process requiring reversal. 98
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

United States v. Pavich, supra note 46; United States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635 (10th
Cir. 1977) and Miller v. State, 560 P.2d 739, 741 (Wyo. 1977).
United States v. Pinky, 548 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 1977).
United States v. Pavich, supra note 46. Contra, People v. McIntyre, supra note 42.
See, Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinions in Faretta.
Martinez v. People, 172 Colo. 82, 470 P.2d 26 (1970).
Id at 28.
Id at 29.
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One answer is to remedy the situation during trial.
Although the judge is a likely candidate for the task and has
a general duty to assure a fair and just trial, it is not feasible
to require him to take over all areas in which a pro se defendant may be incompetent. 9 It is reasonable to expect that
his obligation extends to providing jury instructions or
preventing the prosecution from taking advantage of the ignorance of the defendant by halting a line of questioning
that is clearly improper, but he can hardly be expected to
take over the task of examining witnesses for the
defendant.'0 0 Advisory counsel could be useful, either in
assisting the defendant to intelligently conduct his defense
or with the consent of the defendant taking over some portions of the defense. ' However, in Martinez the defendant
refused advisory counsel. In such a case the only alternative
would be to find the defendant incompetent and provide him
with a defense attorney. If a court were unwilling to take this
extreme measure, the remedies discussed in regard to Hobson's choice could also be helpful here. At present, in most
jurisdictions the "no right to hybrid representation" rule
prevails and even if a defendant is mute throughout his trial,
he is allowed to live and be incarcerated by his decision. Only
if he "engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct"'' 0
do most courts take action by terminating the defendant's
pro se status and bring in standby counsel.
VII.

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF

Pro Se REPRESENTATION

In addition to questions concerning competency and
conduct at trial the constitutional status of self representation raises questions concerning pro se defendants' rights
prior to trial. Chief among them are questions concerning
rights to access to legal materials in order to prepare for trial
and right to a continuance in order to have time to prepare.
The problem of access to legal materials effects only
those pro se defendants who cannot post bond pending trial
99.
100.
101.
102.

United States v. Trapnell, supra note 89.
United States v. Pavich, supra note 46, at 39-40; United States v. Pinky, supra note
93; and the cases cited therein.
For a successful case of a defendant being ably assisted by his advisory counsel, see
State v. Wilson, 563 P.2d 792 (Utah 1977).
Faretta at 834, n. 46. See also, United States v. Theriault, 474 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. den. 411 U.S. 984 (1973); and for a discussion of denial of the right on this
basis see People v. McIntyre, supra note 42, at 327-28.
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or who are already incarcerated on other charges. Although
there has been little litigation in the area, an analagous concern, access to legal materials by prisoners, has received considerable attention. In particular the United States Supreme
Court has held in Bounds v. Smith that:
The fundamental constitutional right of access to
the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law. 10 3
Initially it would seem that Bounds0 4 would guarantee

that pro se defendants have rights to access to legal
materials. If law books are necessary for prisoners to have
access to courts, they are crucial for the incarcerated defendant who must prepare for trial. Nor would the alternative
allowed by the court, "adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law," seem sufficient to meet the needs of a
defendant who must present his own defense. But this is not
how the rule of Bounds has been applied. In United States v.
West' a pro se defendant was a federal prisoner incarcerated in a facility which did not have a law library. The
attorney appointed to assist him was instructed not to actively participate in the defense but to provide assistance if
and when requested. The defendant wanted access to a law
library, a telephone, and a typewriter, but the request was
denied because he was considered a potential escapee and a
suicide risk. Appointed counsel visited him seven times offering to do any research. The offer was refused each time;
the defendant insisting that he should do research himself if
he was going to be the one to try the case.'10 He was allowed
to spend one afternoon calling potential witnesses. On appeal the court held that the arrangement qualified as "adequate assistance from persons trained in the law" satisfying
Bounds v. Smith.10 7
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817. 828 (1977). The principle had been previously
established in Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, affd. sub. nom. Younger v.
Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id
United States v. West, 557 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1977).
IM at 152.
Id. at 153.
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When pro se defendants are confined in a facility which
has a law library, their right of access to those materials is
clear.'0 8 The difficult case is that of the pro se defendant who
is confined in a facility which does not have a law library.
Although advisory counsel may serve to satisfy the defendant's needs, practically it is difficult to say that he is adequate substitute for direct access to legal materials.
Although United States v. West holds to the contrary, the
key features of that case may be that the defendant was considered dangerous and that the advisory counsel visited him
seven times. Placing the burden of preparation on advisory
counsel as a means of satisfying the right also creates difficulties. It creates an affirmative obligation on counsel to
consult with the defendant and do research for him. Failure
to meet his needs may be grounds for appeal. It is also
unlikely to be a popular alternative. Not many attorneys will
be pleased to find themselves research assistants for pro se
defendants.
A further matter in regard to access to legal materials
should be noted. In People v. Carter °9 the defendant, when
asked by the judge whether he felt he was capable of
representing himself, answered "Yes, I do, if I am granted
the use of the law library."" I0 Shortly after this exchange the
jury was sworn in and, despite the protests of the defendant
because he wanted time to use a law library, the trial began.
On appeal the court ruled that there had been no effective
waiver of counsel because whatever waiver had been offered
was conditioned upon access to a law library and was valid
only if the condition was accepted by the court. While this is
not instructive to advisory counsel, an attorney, whose incarcerated defendant is going to request permission to appear pro se, would do well to advise him to condition his request. Although Bounds should guarantee his right to access to legal materials, it is most frequently applied to prison
libraries and the case law governing its application is still inthe formative stage.
Another issue is whether a pro se defendant is entitled
to a continuance in order to have time to prepare for trial. In
108. Hernandez v. Dist. Court in and for Fremont County, 568 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1977).
109. People v. Carter, 66 Cal. 2d 666, 427 P.2d 214, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967).
110. Id at 617.
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Irvin v. State the Wyoming Supreme Court followed its long
standing rule that "a motion for continuance based upon the
necessity for additional trial preparation is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.""' There seems to be no
jurisdiction which deviates substantially from this rule. It
was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Ungar
v. Sarafite. 2 Although its use is widespread, the rule suffers
from vagueness.
There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a
denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate
due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in
to the trial judge at the time
the reasons presented 113
the request is denied.
Applied to pro se defendants, there is a further problem
that the rule may act as a penalty on the exercise of the constitutional right to defend pro se. Exercise of the right is
generally permitted any time prior to the actual start of
trial, but the effect of a denial of a continuance is to make the
right less of a right immediately prior to trial. In addition,
the denial of a continuance which forces a defendant to proceed without preparation raises the question of whether or
not he receives a fair trial. 114 Lack of preparation may assure
that the defendant, even though otherwise intelligent and
capable, cannot adequately present his defense. The defendant in Irvin was familiar with the issues because it was his
second trial. However, the court supported its sustaining the
trial court's denial of a continuance by pointing out that Irvin was not justified in discharging his attorney and that the
attorney was otherwise available so that Irvin did not need
to defend pro se. However attractive this analysis may be,
because Irvin was exercising a constitutional right, the circumstances under which he chose to exercise that right
should not limit it." 5
111.

Irvin v. State, supra note 4.

112.
113.
114.

Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964).
Id at 589.
This point was raised by Justice Rose in his dissenting opinion to Irvin v. State,
supra note 4.
People v. Williams, 386 Mich. 565, 194 N.W.2d 337 (1972).

115.
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THE ROLE OF ADVISORY COUNSEL

With the exception of cases in which the appellant
claims that he was denied effective representation because of
the inactions of his advisory counsel, the role of advisory
counsel has not been litigated. Most cases are settled on the
basis of whether or not counsel had been waived, rather than
specific duties owed by advisory counsel. In general, so long
as there is a waiver, no duty is owed except that of being
available for consultation; without a waiver the defendant is
entitled to full representation by the attorney. It is possible,
however, to provide some analysis and advice on the basis of
reported cases.
Cases can be classified on the basis of whether the attorney was passive or active in his role. As has already been
indicated the passive role pertains to an attorney who
assists a defendant before trial and may sit with him at trial
in order to provide advice and counsel, but who does not take
part in any of the proceedings. In contrast, an active advisory counsel may undertake many of the same activities he
would if he were the trial attorney but does it to assist a pro
se defendant. Two general principles control within each
class. First, because of the constitutional status of the pro se
right, the wishes of the defendant should be determinative.
Second, any activity undertaken by the attorney is probably
acceptable so long as it is not opposed by the defendant or
clearly contrary to his pro se role.
Usually the role of advisory counsel is passive. In addition to his standby function, he is assigned to advise and
counsel the defendant, not to take part in the trial. This
passive role may take one of two general forms. In the most
passive form, and when directed by the court, the attorney is
available to answer questions and confer only when asked.11 6
The alternative, yet still passive, role is for advisory counsel
not to wait to be asked but volunteer information and advice
to the defendant. Obvious examples are telling the defendant
when to make objections and suggesting questions to be
asked in cross examination. Prior to trial the difference can
116. United States v. Price, supra note 39, at 1227; Moore v. State, 142 Ga App. 145, 235
S.E.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1977).
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be seen in whether advisory counsel consults on his own initiative with the defendant, assisting him in choosing his
strategy and preparing his defense, or whether the attorney
waits to be consulted by the defendant. Unless directed by
the trial judge, advisory counsel is usually not under any
obligation to volunteer assistance. He may, of course, do so
out of his own sense of professional and personal obligation,
but if his offer is rejected, the attorney must respect the
defendant's wishes. So long as there has been a valid waiver
of counsel, and unless otherwise instructed by the Court, advisory counsel's only obligation is to remain available.
Although the most common role for advisory counsel is
passive, there are many instances in which advisory counsel
has been active in assisting the defendant. Frequently he
must be active because the defendant is incarcerated and
cannot undertake matters himself. "Active" does not mean
that the attorney performs as though he were representing
the defendant; the defendant is still representing himself.
Rather "active" means that he undertakes one or more particular tasks on behalf of the defendant. Cases can be divided
into activities prior to or associated with trial and activities
at trial.
In United States v. Spencer' 7 the defendant claimed on
appeal that he had been denied his right to counsel. After
finding that he had indeed waived his right, the court went
on to set forth "desirable practices for district judges faced
with such a situation in the future.""' Among the suggestions was that indigent defendants be offered advisory
counsel as a resource to whatever extent the defendant
wishes to make use of their services. In particular, the court
suggested, advisory counsel could meet with the prosecuting
attorney, see that discovery procedures were carried out and
necessary motions made, and confer with the defendant. The
court described advisory counsel's role as "doing those
things which the defendant is unable to do for himself.""' 9 It
is not unusual for advisory counsel to play this role. Other
attorneys have had subpoenaes issued, obtained statements
117.
118.
119.

United States v. Spencer, supra note 29.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1051.
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from witnesses and prepared jury instructions for the defendant to submit to the judge."2 0
While activities of the sort mentioned are similar to
those contemplated by the ABA standards and Chief Justice
Burger's comments, they are distinguished by being activities prior to trial or peripheral to the trial rather than activities in the courtroom itself. Participation by advisory
counsel in the trial has, on occasion, been permitted. It is, of
course, subject to the court's discretion. 2 1 Making objections, conducting direct examination of the defendant and
making motions are activities during trial which have been
approved for advisory counsel. 22
Since there is little on which advisory counsel can rely to
define his role in advance and because the services he may
provide can vary widely, two items of advice are offered for
the attorney who is appointed standby or advisory counsel.
First, if he is not familiar with local practices, he should
check with other members of the bar. Although Farettaapplies in all jurisdictions, the attitudes of courts towardpro se
defendants and advisory counsel vary considerably. He
should also consult with the appointing or trial judge to see
what expectations may accompany the appointment. Most
important, he should consult with the defendant. Some
defendants will not wish advisory counsel to even appear at
the defense table, while others will welcome assistance. Second, for the purpose of settling claims on appeal, it would be
well for advisory counsel to see that the wishes of the defendant are placed in the record. 2 3 This is especially important
if there is to be "hybrid" representation or if the defendant
wishes his advisory counsel to perform some specific task
during the trial such as making objections in order to
preserve the record. Establishing advisory counsel's role in
the record at the outset has the additional benefit of assuring that the trial judge understands and approves of what
the attorney will be doing during the trial.
120.
121.
122.
123.

E.g., People v. Kensik, 22 Ill. 2d 567, 177 N.E.2d 162 (1961).
State v. Kandpl1, 530 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
State v. Helms, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977).
For an instance in which the record was helpful, though not in the defendant's interests, see, City of Chicago v. Kiger, 130 Ill. App. 2d 162, 264 N.E.2d 488, 491 (I.

Ct. App. 1970).
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Finally, advisory counsel should be aware that if he
plays too active of a role, the defendant by consenting or
failure to object may loose his right to appear pro se. In
United States v. Conder 24 the trial court granted the defendant permission to appear pro se. When the defendant later
complained that he lacked the books and materials necessary
to prepare motions he wished to file, the court appointed
counsel to assist him instructing the attorney "not to force
himself" on the defendant. During the six months prior to
trial both the defendant and the attorney prepared and
argued various motions, all of which were submitted with
the attorney's signature. On the first day of the trial the attorney participated in the selection of the jury, made an
opening statement, and conducted cross-examination of the
first nine prosecution witnesses.1 25 On the second day of trial
the defendant was denied permission to object to the admissibility of evidence. The appellate court held that by accepting the attorney's assistance both during the pretrial
proceedings and on the first day of trial, the defendant had
shown an intent to be represented by counsel rather than by
himself.12
Although this case antedates Faretta,there is indication
that in so far as activities at trial are concerned the result
would not be different under Faretta.In a more recent case,
defendant's motion for leave to represent himself and have
advisory counsel was granted. However, the attorney conducted the entire defense up to the final summation to the
jury at which point the trial court refused to allow the defendant to address the jury. The ruling was upheld on the basis
that having been represented by counsel throughout the
of right to
trial, the defendant was not entitled as a matter
1 27
address, the jury during closing argument.
Advisory counsel should keep the possibility of his supplanting the defendant's pro se status in mind if he finds
himself becoming highly active at trial. There is little reason
for a trial judge to deny a request to allow advisory counsel
to perform a limited role. Nor, even if advisory counsel has
124.
125.
126.
127.

United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 907.
Id. at 908.
State v. Armstrong, 562 P.2d 1129, 1131-32 (Mont. 1977). See also, United States v.
Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. den. 426 U.S. 908 (1976).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/8

30

Byrtus: Pro Se Defendants and Advisory Counsel

1979

COMMENTS

become highly active, should a request by a defendant to perform a limited task be denied. The defendant, after all, has
asserted a right, has probably waived counsel, and the court
should not lightly override the pro se right once properly
asserted. Many trial judges, however, are not tolerant of
unusual procedures, so the advisory attorney should exercise caution.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The chief conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing
discussion is that the law both as to pro se defendants and
advisory counsel is complex, unclear, and unsettled. Many
jurisdictions have now ruled that a request for pro se
representation must be timely, unequivocal and that the
defendant must be given some sort of Faretta warnings.
Most of those jurisdictions have made some indication as to
whether or not the right to counsel must be waived.
However, the extent of the warnings to be given and whether
and to what extent there must be additional questioning to
find a waiver is frequently uncertain. In addition, the relationship between the Faretta warnings and the waiver of
counsel is dealt with in a variety of ways. Courts have also
confused requests for advisory counsel and requests for cocounsel status. And methods to deal with the problem of
guaranteeing a fair trial raised by incompetent or unwilling
pro se defendants have not been fully developed. Because of
these uncertainties, the role of advisory counsel is unclear
and an attorney in that role may find himself struggling with
these matters without any means to find answers to his
questions. There is little clear law he can follow. The use of
the terms "standby" and "advisory" is not consistent from
one court to another. The expectations of judges vary both
as to their understanding of the terms and the case at hand.
And the defendant may or may not want assistance and may
or may not have waived his right to counsel. This comment
has presented an analysis of the considerations involved and
has indicated some means by which courts might solve some
of the problems they face.
PAUL
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